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                                 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
__________ 
 
No. 11-3958 
__________ 
 
MARIO MENDOZA, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 3:11-cv-03540) 
District Judge: Hon. Joel A. Pisano 
__________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 22, 2012 
 
Before: AMBRO, VANASKIE and ALDISERT, 
 
Circuit Judges 
(Filed: June 28, 2012) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge
In 2006 Mario Mendoza pleaded guilty to an aggravated felony and, as a result, 
now faces imminent removal from the United States. He appeals from the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey’s order denying his petition for a writ of 
error coram nobis, in which he sought to vacate his plea due to his counsel’s failure to 
. 
2 
apprise him that his conviction would lead to deportation. For the reasons that follow, we 
will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
I. 
 Because we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and the 
proceedings in this case, we will revisit them only briefly.  
 Mendoza was born in Ecuador and lives in New Jersey. From 1996 to 2001, while 
working as a licensed realtor, he helped borrowers obtain federally insured mortgages. 
His behavior led the government to charge him with conspiring to fraudulently induce the 
Federal Housing Authority to insure mortgage loans, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 
1001. Mendoza’s counsel, Glen Cavanagh, explained to him he could avoid prison by 
pleading guilty. Cavanagh did not, however, apprise Mendoza that, as an aggravated 
felony, his crime would lead to mandatory deportation. See
 Mendoza entered his plea on March 29, 2006. Prior to sentencing on September 
11, 2006, Mendoza learned from his Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) that his 
conviction might result in removal. The District Court sentenced Mendoza to two years’ 
probation and ordered him to pay $100,000 in restitution. As a condition of his probation, 
Mendoza was required to cooperate with immigration officials. 
 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  
Sometime after Mendoza received his sentence, the government instituted removal 
proceedings and ordered him to leave the country. On January 14, 2010, after completing 
his sentence, Mendoza filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and Rule 32(d) of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to vacate his sentence and withdraw his plea. In it, 
Mendoza contended that Cavanagh did not warn him of the immigration implications of 
pleading guilty to an aggravated felony and noted that it was an open question whether a 
lawyer renders constitutionally deficient performance by failing to highlight a plea’s 
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immigration consequences. On March 31, 2010, the Supreme Court answered that 
question in the affirmative. See Padilla v. Kentucky
Nine months after that, on June 8, 2011, Mendoza repackaged these same 
arguments in a petition for a writ of error coram nobis. Mendoza contended that, had he 
been aware that a guilty plea would subject him to deportation, he would not have 
pleaded guilty and would have instead attempted to negotiate a better deal or risked trial. 
On September 21, 2011, after noting the issue of Mendoza’s counsel’s ineffectiveness, 
the District Court denied Mendoza’s petition on the alternative grounds that he filed after 
an unreasonable delay and did not assert his innocence. Mendoza timely appealed. 
, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). Five months 
later, on September 9, 2010, Mendoza withdrew his motion to vacate his plea.  
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction over the petition under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), in 
aid of its jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291. We review the District Court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings 
for clear error. See United States v. Orocio
III. 
, 645 F.3d 630, 635 (3d Cir. 2011).  
Notwithstanding Mendoza’s counsel’s deficient performance, we agree with the 
District Court that Mendoza’s unreasonable delay in filing his coram nobis petition 
forestalls his efforts to seek relief. The rare remedy of a writ of error coram nobis may be 
“used to attack allegedly invalid convictions which have continuing consequence, when 
the petitioner has served his sentence and is no longer ‘in custody’ for purposes of 28 
U.S.C. § 2255.” United States v. Stoneman, 870 F.2d 102, 105-106 (3d Cir. 1989). Such 
relief is appropriate, however, only “[(a)] to correct errors for which there was no remedy 
available at the time of trial and [(b)] where ‘sound reasons’ exist for failing to seek relief 
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earlier.” Id. at 106 (quoting United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 512 (1954)). This 
“sound reason” standard is even stricter than that used to evaluate § 2255 petitions. Id. 
Indeed, “‘it is difficult to conceive of a situation in a federal criminal case today where a 
writ of coram nobis would be necessary or appropriate.’” Carlisle v. United States, 517 
U.S. 416, 429 (1996) (quoting United States v. Smith
Although Mendoza’s counsel’s deficient performance may have precluded him 
from seeking relief at the time of his plea, Mendoza cannot show any “sound reasons” for 
his lengthy delay in seeking relief since that time. Mendoza became aware of his plea’s 
deportation consequences in September 2006 via his PSR, yet did not allege until 2010 
that his counsel was ineffective. He attributes this four-year delay to a combination of: (a) 
his (mistaken) belief that his cooperation with immigration officials would stave off his 
deportation, and (b) the absence of Supreme Court precedent regarding a counsel’s duty 
to warn of a plea’s immigration consequences—only after the Supreme Court decided 
, 331 U.S. 469, 475 n.4 (1947)). 
Padilla
These are not “sound reasons.” First, Mendoza’s cooperation was a condition of 
his probation, not of his remaining in the country, and any indications to the contrary 
were not of the government’s making. Second, we have held that 
, Mendoza contends, could he have known that his counsel was ineffective.  
Padilla did not create a 
“new rule” for retroactivity purposes precisely because lawyers in the Third Circuit have 
long been expected to advise clients of a plea’s deportation implications. See Orocio, 645 
F.3d at 640 (“Lower court decisions not in harmony with Padilla were, with few 
exceptions, decided before 1995 and pre-date the professional norms that . . . had long 
demanded that competent counsel provide advice on the removal consequences of a 
client’s plea.”).1 Indeed, Orocio
                                              
1 On April 30, 2012, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of 
whether Padilla created a “new rule,” see Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989), and 
 involved a petition for a writ of error coram nobis based 
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on facts almost identical to those here, except Orocio filed his petition alleging deficient 
performance before the Supreme Court decided Padilla, based on existing precedent, and 
did so immediately upon learning of his impending deportation. Mendoza was not as 
diligent. Mendoza has known of the threat of removal since at least 2006, and his § 2255 
motion to vacate his conviction because of ineffective assistance—filed six months 
before Padilla was decided and a full year-and-a-half before his present petition—
demonstrated that he did not need the Supreme Court’s clarification to have raised his 
present contentions. That the law is unsettled does not justify a delay in filing a coram 
nobis petition, cf. Bousley v. United States
Finally, even if Mendoza had properly and timely raised his ineffective assistance 
claims, we note that his underlying efforts to withdraw his plea would almost certainly 
fail. To withdraw a plea of guilty, a defendant must: (1) demonstrate strong reasons for 
the withdrawal (2) assert his innocence, and (3) show that the withdrawal will not unduly 
prejudice the government. 
, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998) (“[F]utility cannot 
constitute cause . . . if it means simply that a claim was unacceptable to that particular 
court at that particular time. (quotation omitted)), nor does the record reveal any other 
“sound reason” for waiting so long to seek relief.  
See United States v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 252 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(citing United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 811, 815 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Huff
                                                                                                                                                  
thus, would not apply retroactively on collateral review. See Chaidez v. United States, 
655 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 566 U.S. ___ (2012) (No. 11-820). Although 
this question has split the circuits, compare Orocio, 645 F.3d 630 (holding that Padilla is 
retroactive), with Chaidez, 655 F.3d 684 (holding that Padilla does not apply 
retroactively) and United States v. Chang Hong, 671 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2011) (same), 
its resolution has no bearing on Mendoza’s claim, which falls short regardless. If the 
Supreme Court were to overrule Orocio and conclude that Padilla did, in fact, create a 
“new rule,” such a ruling may strengthen Mendoza’s argument that he was previously 
unaware of the rule, but would also preclude him from invoking Padilla retroactively, 
effectively foreclosing his claim. See, e.g., Orocio, 645 F.3d at 637-641. 
, 
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873 F.2d 709, 711 (3d Cir. 1989)). Cavanagh’s egregious error and Mendoza’s looming 
removal surely constitute a strong reason to withdraw the plea. See United States v. Trott
* * * * * 
, 
779 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1985) (discussing how allegations of a plea’s involuntariness relate 
only to the strength of the defendant’s reasons for withdrawal). But Mendoza has not 
asserted his innocence; rather, he has claimed merely that he would have sought a more 
favorable plea deal or risked trial. It does not appear that such a speculatively favorable 
plea deal existed, nor that a trial would have resulted in any less than a conviction for an 
aggravated felony. More importantly, the government would certainly be prejudiced by 
the prosecution of a case involving facts nearly a decade dormant.  
We have considered all of the arguments advanced by the parties and conclude 
that no further discussion is necessary. The judgment of the District Court will be 
AFFIRMED. 
